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Abstract
This paper tests whether the academic achievement is a signiﬁcant
determinant of the employment status in the Italian labor market: are the
new entrepreneurs selected from the top or bottom end of the graduates
ability distribution? Is the cream of the graduate crop pulled into self-
employment by the higher expected earnings or are the individuals with
lower degree score pushed into entrepreneurship by poor alternatives?
Our data show a strong negative relation between academic achievement
and self-employment status, i.e. we assess the skimming of the best
graduates into wage and salary work.
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1 Introduction
This paper tests whether the academic achievement is a signiﬁcant determi-
nant of the employment status: are the new entrepreneurs selected from the
top or bottom end of the graduates ability distribution? Is the cream (the
part that rises to the top) of the graduate crop pulled into self-employment
by the higher expected earnings or are the individuals with lower degree score
pushed into entrepreneurship by poor alternatives (?)?
Previous research on the empirical relation between education and en-
trepreneurship ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant selection eﬀect. A meta-analysis of 94
academic studies conducted by ? measures the impact of schooling on self-
employment and draws the conclusion that the eﬀect of education on en-
trepreneurship is neither positive nor negative.1
In this paper we provide additional empirical evidence for the Italian labor
market. In particular, our data show a strong negative relation between aca-
demic achievement and self-employment status, i. e. we assess the skimming
of the best graduates into wage and salary work.
This paper has two advantages over previous research. First, in Italy
self-employment represents a clear alternative to wage and salary employment
because the share of self-employed workers over total employed is above 28 per-
cent.2 Moreover, the self-employment rate among graduate workers is about
26 percent, the highest rate in Europe and more than double the share in
Denmark, France, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Netherlands and Finland (?.
Second, our data allow to shift the focus of the relationship between school-
ing and employment status from the highest level of education completed to
more speciﬁc measurements like as degree scores and completion speed by ma-
jors. To our knowledge, ability as measured by degree performance has rarely
been used in previous analyzes of self-employment. As far as we know, only ?
consider degree class and A level score. They draw the conclusion that these
variables have no signiﬁcant role to play in their analysis.3
2 Related Literature
We focus our analysis on two questions: 1) Why do some people choose self-
employment over wage employment? 2) Why do the best Italian graduates
prefer wage-employment? The theoretical literature on entrepreneurship ar-
gues that those who choose self-employment are all individuals for whom the
use of their ability in entrepreneurial functions guarantees earnings higher
than they would otherwise receive (?)3. Therefore people in self-employment
are related to both entrepreneurial ability and outside options. ? suggest that
education enhances individual managerial ability and increases the probability
of choosing self-employment because more educated workers tend to be better
informed and more eﬃcient at assessing entrepreneurial opportunities. How-
ever, this positive eﬀect may be dominated by an opposite (negative) eﬀect
of education on entrepreneurship selection. In fact, higher educational perfor-
mances might generate better outside options in paid employment, and thus
depress the likelihood of self-employment as the preferred choice (?).
Our data show that the degree score is higher for employees than it is
for the self-employed, even if the graduate starting salary is higher for male
self-employed (but not for female self-employed). This positive selection eﬀect
into paid work may be due either to the attractiveness of a career prospect4
or to the attractiveness of employment protection on young graduates.5
The debate on the European labor market regulation has emphasized the
negative eﬀect of employment protection legislation on the ﬁrms’ ﬁring costs
(?). In contrast, the results presented here highlight a positive eﬀect deriving
to ﬁrms from the stability of the employment relationship: it induces job-
seekers to compete for vacancies, so that ﬁrms can apply selection criteria to
screen the best of them (?).
Thus the employment protection legislation may have two consequences on
self-employment. First, it may make self-employment an attractive option for
low-ability graduates who have failed to pass ﬁrms’ selection processes, partic-4
ularly if employers attempt to circumvent the negative eﬀect of employment
protection legislation by contracting-out work to self-employed contractors
(?).6 Second, our data show that job protection may induce the best grad-
uates to prefer dependent employment, dissuading the ”cream of the crop”
from taking up other options as the self-employment status.
As suggested by the referees, we produce separate gender speciﬁc estimates
because several studies show that female and male entrepreneurs diﬀer in many
respects. 7
The previous literature on gender and entrepreneurship shows that female
and male entrepreneurs may diﬀer in their motivations: ? report that males
have a higher preference for entrepreneurship than females; ? ﬁnds that women
choose entrepreneurship in order to achieve a balance between career and per-
sonal life/family. ? highlight the desire of women to pursue entrepreneurship
for career advancement as well: they suggest that women are motivated to
choose entrepreneurship because they experience gender related barriers to
their career advancement in paid employment. In this paper we add to pre-
vious literature showing that the best female graduates prefer job protection
of the subordinate labor contracts to career advancement and ﬂexibility of
self-employment.
3 Data and Methodology
Data
Our data are derived from the Survey on Labor Market Transitions of
University Graduates carried out in 2004 by the Italian National Statistical
Oﬃce. The Survey is the result of interviewing Italians who graduated from
university in 2001 three years after graduation. The retrospective informa-
tion gathered allows us to analyze both academic performance (ﬁnal degree
grades) and initial entry into the labor market.8 The data contain information
on the educational curriculum, the occupational status, the student’s family5
background and personal characteristics.
In particular, the principal variables contained in the data set can be di-
vided into the following ﬁve main groups. (i) University Career and High
School Background: including, kind of high school attended, high school mark,
other education, university, subject, duration, degree score, accommodation,
work during university, post graduate studies,(ii) Work Experience: including,
experience in actual work, experience, type of work, net monthly wage,(iii)
Work Search: including, kind of work desired, willingness to work abroad,
preference over time table, minimum net monthly wage required, (iv) Fam-
ily Information: including, parents’ work, parents’ education level, brothers
and/or sisters, (v) Personal Characteristics: including, date of birth, sex,
marital status, children, country of domicile, country of birth, residence.
Following much of the existing empirical literature, the sample used in this
study was constructed in the following way. We restrict the sample to male
individuals because of the gender diﬀerences in the labor market behavior.
Further, we exclude individuals that work in the sector of primary produc-
tion, in line with ?, ? and ?. We omit individuals who graduated in the ﬁeld
of medicine as their career path is very diﬀerent from that of other graduates.9
Finally, the sample consists of full-time workers only.10 We end up with a sam-
ple of 5203 individuals, 1065 are self-employed and 4138 employees, a sample
self-employment rate of about 20%. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for
the sample used.
Figure ?? shows the empirical distribution of earnings for self-employed
and employees.11 We observe that the distribution of self-employment earnings
exhibits greater dispersion and is more skewed than the employees distribution.
As indicated by the tails of the self-employment distribution, about 9 (13)
percent of business owners earn more (less) than 2500 (800) euros per month,
compared to only 2 (1) percent of employees.
Further evidence of the diﬀerences in self-employment and employee net6
monthly earnings distributions is shown in tables 1 and 2. Self-employed peo-
ple seem to earn more on average than employees do. The standard deviation
of the income of the self-employed is also two times higher than for the employ-
ees. Table 2 shows the distribution of the net monthly earning by job status.
Both tables are consistent with the view that the self-employment typically
oﬀers higher earnings but is a more risky option because the increased changes
of higher earnings are balanced to some extent by the increased changes of low
earnings.
There is now clear evidence in the literature that self-employed workers
have more variable and unequal incomes than employees do (?). As an exam-
ple, all the studies on the distribution of self-employment income explored by ?
show that the self-employed are over-represented in both the upper and lower
tails of the overall income distribution. However, we observe that in our sam-
ple two opposite grounds may explain the self-employed income distribution.
From one side we consider only graduate workers. Indeed, the education may
reduce the variation in the self-employment earning as stressed by ?. From the
other side we take into account a ﬁrst entry in the job market, i.e. the earnings
are sampled at an early stage of the graduate’s career. In particular, this sam-
pling may thick the left tail of the self-employed earning distribution where
low earnings may merely reﬂect the initial costs of establishing a business.
In the following, we attempt to show the inﬂuence of the individual ability
on the choice to become self-employed. To this end, we measure the unob-
servable ability by means of the degree performance. The degree performance
takes into account both the ﬁnal degree mark and the speed12 at which stu-
dents complete their academic career. Both information are gathered in what
we call the ”educational performance”: edperf.
edperf =
dscore
1 + 0.10 × years
(1)
where dscore is the degree mark plus the laude or highest honors when it7
occurs. The number of years in excess (years) used to get the degree is even-
tually corrected for those having carried out military service during university
years. Obviously, the degree scores have been normalized to take into account
the diﬀerent marking scale for each faculty.13
Figure 2 shows the cumulative distribution functions of the educational
performance (edperf ) for employee and self-employed graduates. Our data
clearly show a ﬁrst order stochastic dominance of employees with respect to
self-employed.14 Hence, when we only consider the eﬀect of the academic
achievement on the self employed status we ﬁnd a clear and strong negative
relation. In the following we investigate whether this relation holds also when
we control for other variables as individual characteristics (for instance family
background) and the potential earning obtained from working in each sector.
Methodology
We investigate the eﬀect of the educational performance on the choice
between self-employment and paid-employment by means of the model of ?
and similar to the models estimated by ?, ?, ? and ?. The motivation of the
model, which is a standard selection model of the employment status decision,
is that the self-employed have a comparative advantage of working in that
sector. An individual chooses to work in the self-employed sector if his utility
is higher than in the paid-employed sector. Formally, an individual i will
choose to be self-employed if:
Use
i − Ue
i ≡ α0(ln(Y se
i ) − ln(Y e
i )) + α1Xi + ǫi > 0
where the superscripts se and e refer to the self-employment and employed
sector, respectively. The utility obtained in each sector, i.e. the choice of
sector, depends on personal characteristics, such as social background, risk
attitudes, family responsibilities and education (the variables included in X),15
on nonpecuniary utility from independence and on the earnings diﬀerential
in the two sectors, Y se and Y e, respectively. Because the earnings of an8
individual is only observed in the sector which he or she works, a sample
selection problem may arise. This problem is overcome by estimating earnings
equations for the self-employed and the paid employed augmented with the
appropriate sample selection corrections (Table 4). Therefore, we ﬁrst estimate
a reduced form probit model (Table 5) for the choice of being self-employed
and then we make use of this estimation result to eventually correct the earning
regression estimation for the sample selection (? two-step procedure). Last,
we estimate the structural form probit (Table 5) which includes as regressors
also the diﬀerence in the natural logarithm of the earnings in the two sectors,
(ln(Y se
i ) − ln(Y e
i )).
The structural probit equation is identiﬁed by means of variables that
appear in the structural probit but not in the earnings equations. These
variables should aﬀect the choice to become self-employed/employees but not
earnings.16 We identify the structural probit by omitting the dummy variable
Children from the earnings equations. In fact, while there is no reason to
expect that being married should aﬀect earnings, the number of children has
been found in several studies,17 to be correlated with being self-employed.
At the same time, the identiﬁcation of the structural probit equation re-
lies also on the exclusion of variables which aﬀect the selection decision only
through the earnings equations. Following ? and ? we drop from the struc-
tural probit equation the education level dummies of the individual, i.e. the
dummy Qualiﬁcation which assumes a value of 1 whether the graduate work-
ers has attempted further qualiﬁcation after graduation. We therefore assume
that the education level dummies of the individual aﬀects the choice to be self-
employed or not through earnings eﬀects only. Further, we exclude from the
structural probit equation the dummy variable Work Experience which indi-
cates whether the individual has started his actual work before the graduation
or, more in general, was working before he graduated.9
4 Results
? and ? ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant role for the predicted earnings diﬀer-
ential in the estimates of the self-employment decision. In contrast with these
results, our data suggest that the earnings distribution provides incentives to
be self-employed in line with the ﬁndings of ?, ?, ?, ? and ?. The coeﬃ-
cient of the predicted earnings diﬀerence used in the structural probit model
is positive and signiﬁcant (see table 5). This implies that the more the pre-
dicted self-employment (employees) earnings exceed the predicted employees
(self-employed) earnings for a given individual, the more likely that individual
is to be self-employed (employee).
We turn now to analyze the inﬂuence of the direct eﬀect of ability (as
measured by the educational performance) on the entrepreneurial choice. ?
ﬁnd that ability, measured by A-level and degree performance, has no signif-
icant role to play. In contrast with this result, we ﬁnd that the educational
performance raises the likelihood to become employee (row 2 of the structural
probit equation in table 5), that is we ﬁnd evidence that high ability gradu-
ates are drawn to wage-employment by something other than better earnings.
This may be due to the attractiveness of employment protection legislation
on young graduates. Traditionally, the Italian standard work contracts have
been characterized by high degree of employment protection, mostly against
dismissals.
Further, we observe that the educational performance has a positive and
signiﬁcant impact only on the employees earnings (row 3 of table 4).18 This re-
sult seems to be consistent with the presence of a signalling eﬀect of the best
graduates in wage-employment. Moreover, our empirical results oﬀer some
support for the strong screening hypothesis (SSH) which states that schooling
is merely a signal of the productivity for employers. A widely used test to
verify the screening hypothesis is to compare the returns to educational per-
formance for the self-employed (the unscreened control group) and employees10
(the screened group). The idea is that self-employed have no need to signal
inherent ability and therefore any return they make to education represent a
true return to human capital investments. If it turns out that the returns to
educational performance for the self-employed are insigniﬁcant and the returns
to educational performance are signiﬁcantly positive for employees this would
give support for the SSH (see ?, ?, ? and ?).
Table 4 show the estimation results for the earnings’ equation in both al-
ternative employment status. Both equations are corrected for possible sample
selection bias.
The sample selection terms, lambda, obtained from the reduced form pro-
bit, show that there is negative selection bias for the observed earnings of
male self-employed only. This means that earnings of males who choose self-
employment are signiﬁcantly lower from earnings they would have obtained
in wage-work. As we ground our model in a utility framework where utility
is a function not only of expected income but also of nonpecuniary beneﬁt
to be ones’ own boss, this result suggests that the self-employed are happier
than employees. The empirical results of ? and ? are also consistent with the
hypothesis that the self-employed get higher level of job and life satisfaction
than employees. This result stands in contrast to those of ? and ? who ﬁnd
evidence of positive selection bias for the observed earnings of employees, but
no selectivity bias for the self-employed. In other words, they ﬁnd that the
average earnings of individuals with given measured characteristics who have
chosen to be employees is greater than what employee earnings would be for
those with the same measured characteristics who choose self-employment.
Last, turning to the structural probit equation, we observe that the family
size variable (Children) is signifcant in explaining the choice to become self-
employed. The presence of children reduces the incidence of self-employment
for both men and women. This is consistent with the desire to reduce the
riskiness of ones income (as shown in ﬁg. 1) by seeking out employment in11
the waged sector (i.e. a steady job entitled with full rights to social security).
Conversely, this contrasts with the ﬁndings of ?, and ? that children positively
inﬂuenced the probability of female self-employment due to the need to balance
work and childcare commitments. Also ? suggest that the rigidity of waged
employment in terms of ﬁxed hours and contractual obligations is less suited
to mothers of young children, but in our data job protection (maternity and
parental leaves and insurance for sickness or unemployment periods) result
more attactive than the ﬂexibility of self-employment.
5 Conclusion
A graduate individual will choose wage employment instead of self-employment
when the beneﬁt expected from pursuing a career as employee is higher than
that of becoming an entrepreneur. Monetary earnings are one of the most
important beneﬁt of employment but the choice of a career also depends on
preferences and personal attitudes such as speciﬁc abilities. As an individual’s
earnings are only observed in the sector in which he works, sample selection
problems may arise. Following ? and ? we separate the direct eﬀect of abil-
ity on the entrepreneurial choice from the indirect eﬀect of this characteristic
through the expected earnings diﬀerential. Our data show that both relative
income and ability have a positive role on the choice between self-employment
and wage employment: the probability of being an employee depends posi-
tively on both the predicted earnings diﬀerential and educational performance.
We draw the conclusion that ﬁrms can skim the cream of the Italian gradu-
ate crop and reject low ability individuals pushing them into self-employment,
even if they would have otherwise preferred to work as employees. As a con-
sequence, policies based on increasing the returns from self-employment are
unlikely to encourage the best graduates to become self-employed at the be-
ginning of their careers. However, the nature of our data set means that these
results have to be treated with caution. The graduates are only a short way12
into their careers and they could change the choice between wage employment
and self-employment several times during their life work.
Notes
1 For example, ? shows that in Europe the probabilities of being self-
employed are lower the more educated an individual is, while the opposite is
true in the US. In Italy, as in the U.S., the probability of being self-employed
is higher for tertiary educated persons (?).
2In Italy the self-employment rate is three times higher than in Denmark
and more than double the share in France, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands,
Austria and Finland (?).
3A recent theory formalized in ? and ? posits that an individual who is
innately well versed in a variety of ﬁelds, i. e. a Jack-of-All-Trades, has a high
probability of becoming entrepreneur. Consistent evidence that a balanced
skill-mix causally stimulates entrepreneurship is given in ? on German data.
On the contrary, ? on Italian data shows that gathering expertise across
various subjects does not increase the chances of becoming entrepreneur.
4A referee suggests this hypothesis, that we cannot neither conﬁrm nor
reject because our data refers to individuals with a very short career advance-
ment three years after graduation.
5Traditionally, the Italian standard work contracts have been characterized
by high degree of employment protection, mostly against dismissals. Accord-
ing to the ?’s Employment Outlook, Italy ranked ﬁrst in terms of strictness of
the regulation of permanent contracts during the 1990’s.
6? ﬁnds only very limited evidence to support the hypothesis that stricter13
employment protection legislation promotes self-employment in OECD coun-
tries.
7For example, female entrepreneurs have been found to be more educated
either in the U.K. ? and in Italy ( ?). Also ? ﬁnd substantive diﬀerences
in job creating capability across gender and education that we cannot verify
with our data set.
8The graduate population of 2001 consisted of 155.664 individuals (67.913
males and 87.751 females). The ISTAT survey was based on a 28% sample of
these students and was stratiﬁed on the basis of degree course taken and by
the sex of the individual student. The response rate was about 67.6%, yielding
a data-set containing information on 26.006 graduates.
9After having obtained their degree in medicine, in general the students
carry out a specialist activity which lasts at least three years.
10Following ? we deﬁne the full-time workers as those who worked more
than 30 hours per week.
11The estimate is based on a normal kernel function.
12In the Italian education system, each faculty only sets a minimum number
of years in which to obtain a degree. A consequence is that there is a high
dispersion in the age at which students graduate. The speed of completion of
the academic career is, therefore, together with the ﬁnal mark, an important
component of the educational performance.
13The ﬁnal degree score ranges from 66 to 110 (for some Universities the
maximum mark awarded is 100). According to each faculty internal ruling a
laude (distinction) may be assigned to candidates with a 110/110 mark for
recognition of the excellence of their thesis (in this analysis the 110 cum laude
was transformed to 113).14
14First-order stochastic dominance is a possible ordering between two stochas-
tic distributions. Let F(x) and M(x) denote the cumulative distribution func-
tions of the educational performance x for female and male students, respec-
tively. F ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates M if and only if for every possible
educational performance x, F(x) ≤ M(x). This means that for every possible
value of x, the probability of getting a educational performance that high is
never better in M than in F.
15See ?.
16These variables should be uncorrelated with the error terms of the earnings
equation but have a strong eﬀect on selectivity. See ?.
17See, for instance ? and ?.
18This result is in line with the ﬁndings of ?, ?, ? and ?.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Males Employees Self-employed
Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
Edperf 83.408 17.171 80.798 16.901
ln earnings 3.119 0.103 3.131 0.199
Father self-employed 0.233 0.372
Industrial Sector 0.361 0.139
Qualiﬁcation 0.012 0.004
Work Experience 0.607 0.642
Females Employees Self-employed
Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
Edperf 84.386 17.909 82.722 17.992
ln earnings 3.041 0.115 3.024 0.201
Father self-employed 0.277 0.372
Industrial Sector 0.177 0.075
Qualiﬁcation 0.011 0.009
Work Experience 0.669 0.633
Industrial Sector: A dummy taking the value of 1 if the graduate is working in the
industrial sector.
Work Experience: A dummy taking the value of 1 if the graduate either was work-
ing during the university or has started the actual work before graduating.
Qualiﬁcation: A dummy taking the value of 1 if the graduate has obtained a post-
graduated certiﬁcate of education.
Table 2: Relative frequency distribution of net monthly earnings by
job status
Males Females























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Empirical distribution of earnings for employees and self-employed






































Figure 2: Cumulative distribution functions of the educational performance
for employees and self-employed
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